



Independent Assurance Report

To the management of the Ministry of Digital Affairs :

Scope

We have been engaged, in a reasonable assurance engagement, to report on Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) management's assertion that for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at Taipei and Taichung, Taiwan, throughout the period October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025 for its CA in [Appendix A](#), the MODA has:

- disclosed its business, key lifecycle management, certificate lifecycle management, and CA environmental control practices in its:
 - GTLSCA Certification Practice Statement [V1.0.6](#)
 - Certificate Policy for the Chunghwa Telecom ecommerce Public Key Certificate Policy [V2.1](#)
(Maintained and manage By Chunghwa Telecom)
- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that :
 - GTLSCA's Certification Practice Statement is consistent with its Certificate Policy
 - GTLSCA provides its services in accordance with its Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement
 - Chunghwa Telecom ePKI provides its services in accordance with its Certificate Policy and GTLSCA's Certification Practice Statement



- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that :
 - the integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles;
 - the integrity of subscriber certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles;
 - subscriber information is properly authenticated for the registration activities performed by GTLSCA

- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that :
 - logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorized individuals;
 - the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
 - CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities [V2.2.2.](#)

GTLSCA do not escrow its CA keys, does not provide subscriber key generation services, and does not provide certificate suspension services. Accordingly, our procedures did not extend to controls that would address those criteria.

GTLSCA has stopped issuing TLS certificates since March 6 2025, and only provides basic and limited operation.



Certification authority's responsibilities

MODA's management is responsible for its assertion, including the fairness of its presentation, and the provision of its described services in accordance with WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities [V2.2.2](#).

Our independence and quality control

We have complied with the independence and other ethical requirements of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, which is founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behavior.

The firm applies International Standard on Quality Control 1, Quality Control for Firms that perform Audits and Reviews of Historical Financial Information, and other Assurance and Related Service, Engagements and accordingly maintains a comprehensive system of quality control including documented policies and procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

KPMG Auditor Team qualifications are listed in [Appendix B](#)



Practitioner's responsibilities

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our procedures. We conducted our procedures in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000, Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information, issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. This standard requires that we plan and perform our procedures to obtain reasonable assurance about whether, in all material respects, management's assertion is fairly stated, and, accordingly, included:

- (1) obtaining an understanding of GTLSCA's key and certificate lifecycle management business practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and confidentiality of subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate lifecycle management operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity;
- (2) selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate lifecycle management business practices;
- (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls;
and
- (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.



The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at GTLSCA and their effect on assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying party locations.

GTLSCA's management has disclosed to KPMG the incidents as detailed in [Appendix C](#) that have been posted in Bugzilla website that can be accessed publicly, from October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025.

Inherent limitations

Because of the nature and inherent limitations of controls, GTLSCA's ability to meet the aforementioned criteria may be affected. For example, controls may not prevent, or detect and correct, error, fraud, unauthorized access to systems and information, or failure to comply with internal and external policies or requirements. Also, the projection of any conclusions based on our findings to future periods is subject to the risk that changes may alter the validity of such conclusions.

Basis for qualified opinion

During our examination, we noted the following which caused a qualification of our opinion:

Observation	Relevant WebTrust Criteria
During the audit period, no objective evidence was found regarding GTLSCA's audit and evaluation for third parties.	WebTrust Principles And Criteria for Certification Authorities - V2.2.2 3.1.11



	Arrangements involving third party access to CA facilities and systems are based on a formal contract containing necessary security requirements.
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Qualified Opinion

In our opinion, except for the matters described in the Basis for qualified opinion section of our report, throughout the period October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025, MODA's management assertion¹, as referred to above, is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities [V2.2.2](#).

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of GTLSCA's services beyond those covered by the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities [V2.2.2](#), nor the suitability of any of GTLSCA's services for any customer's intended purpose.

Use of the WebTrust seal

GTLSCA's use of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Seal constitutes a symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to update this report or provide any additional assurance.

¹ Based on Google announcement, Google Chrome communicated its removal of default trust of Chunghwa Telecom in the public forum on May 30, 2025.



Chen, Pi chi KPMG

KPMG

Certified Public Accountants

Taipei, Taiwan, ROC

November 18, 2025

Appendix A

Issuer Root CA Certificate		
ePKI Root Certificati on Authority - G2 ²	Subject	Issuer
	CN = ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2 O= Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. C=TW	CN = ePKI Root Certification Authority O = Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. C=TW
	Certificate Related Information	Key Related Information
	Serial Number: 3beee0918e8886ad460fe8ae910c9cba Signature Algorithm: sha256RSA Not Before: 2015-11-17 04:51:35 p.m.(UTC+8:00) Not After: 2034-12-20 10:31:27 a.m.(UTC+8:00) Thumbprint Algorithm: sha256 Thumbprint: 1E51942B84FD467BF77D1C89DA241C04254DC8F3EF4C22451FE7A89978BD4F	Subject Public Key: RSA(4096 bits) Authority Key Identifiers: 1e0cf7b667f2e192260945c055392e773f424aa2 Subject Key Identifiers: 725bbaaa7238ee259024b59422fa0988ca8b0afb Basic Constraint: Subject Type=CA Path Length Constraint=None Key Usage: Certificate Signing, Off-line CRL Signing, CRL Signing (06)
	Additional Information	Remark
CRL Distribution Point: http://eca.hinet.net/repository/CRL_SHA2/CA.crl [1]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.10 0.0.1 [2]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.10 0.0.2 [3]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ CA certificate Generation of ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2 signed by ePKI Root Certification Authority 	

² ePKI Root CA is audited by Chunghwa itself and not included in this audit.

	<p>0.0.3 [4]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.10</p> <p>0.0.4 [5]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.10</p> <p>0.0.9 [6]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.10</p> <p>0.0.0 [7]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.1</p> <p>[8]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.2</p> <p>[9]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.3</p> <p>[10]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.4</p> <p>[11]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.0</p> <p>[12]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.1</p> <p>[13]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.2</p> <p>[14]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.3</p> <p>[15]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.1</p> <p>[15,1]Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: https://eca.hinet.net/repository</p>	
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Subordinate CA Certificate		
GTLSCA - G1	Subject	Issuer
	CN = 政府伺服器數位憑證 管理中心 - G1 O=行政院 C=TW	CN = ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2 O = Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. C=TW
	Certificate Related Information	Key Related Information
	Serial Number: 00996d5fe9ade16cdc8ecdbfe db14a3295 Signature Algorithm: sha256RSA Not Before: 2019-07-19 14:46:45 a.m.(UTC+8:00) Not After: 2031-08-19 04:46:45 p.m.(UTC+8:00) Thumbprint Algorithm: sha1 Thumbprint: b2d151a768d30c3b99d86b8b 25815608c28ab2cb Thumbprint Algorithm: sha256 Thumbprint: 9d1cda1b9ef395afce7de0fe7 4de6d9ff5e0d2a43789116c00 c6ba5bf44b9823	Subject Public Key: RSA(4096 bits) Authority Key Identifiers: 725bbaaa7238ee259024b594 22fa0988ca8b0afb Subject Key Identifiers: d6eb2d9d61fe2bbb70882eb8 07b159b0f483226a Basic Constraint: Subject Type=CA Path Length Constraint=0 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, Off-line CRL Signing, CRL Signing (86)
	Additional Information	Remark
	CRL Distribution Point: http://eca.hinet.net/repository/CRL2/CA.crl [1].Certificate Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.100.0.3 [2].Certificate Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.2	■ CA certificate of 1 st Generation of GTLSCA signed by ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2



Appendix B

KPMG Audit Team has a qualified firm and practitioners, provide assurance and attest reports as part of the Firm’s regular business activities and the standards set out in the WebTrust Agreement. A Qualified Firm follows recognized professional auditing standards as published by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) or the Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada (CPA Canada). In addition, practitioners/staff have the necessary technical training, competency and experience to conduct a WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement in accordance with professional auditing standards.

Team Member	Title	Certifications	Years of Experience	Years of Experience with PKI
Team Leader	Partner	CISA,IRCA Registered ISO 27001 LA	More than 21 years	More than 14 years
Member A	Associate Director	ISO 27001 LA	More than 8 years	More than 9 years
Member B	Senior Consultant	ISO 27001 LA	More than 7 years	More than 9 years
Member C	Senior Consultant	CEH,CCNA, ISO 27001 LA	More than 8 years	More than 5 years
Member D	Assistant manager	ISO 27001 LA	More than 10 years	More than 3 years



Appendix C

No	Time	Subject	Publicly Link
1	03.27.2025	Chunghwa Telecom: OV TLS Server certificate issuance by GTLSCA without proper validation	BugZilla Ticket Link

Assertion of Management as to
its Disclosure of its Business Practices and its Controls Over
its Certification Authority Operations
during the period from October 1, 2024 through September 30,
2025

November 18, 2025

The Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) operates the Certification Authority (CA) services known as Government TLS Certification Authority (GTLSCA) in [Appendix A](#) and provides the following CA services:

- Subscriber registration
- Certificate rekey
- Certificate issuance
- Certificate distribution
- Certificate revocation
- Certificate validation

The management of MODA is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its CA operations, including its CA business practices disclosure on its [website](#), CA business practices management, CA environmental controls, CA key lifecycle

management controls, subscriber key lifecycle management controls, certificate lifecycle management controls.

There are inherent limitations in any controls, including the possibility of human error, and the circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective controls can only provide reasonable assurance with respect to GTLSCA's Certification Authority operations. Furthermore, because of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.

MODA management has assessed its disclosures of its certificate practices and controls over its CA services. Based on that assessment, in MODA management's opinion, in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services at in Taipei and Taichung, Taiwan, throughout the period October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025, GTLSCA has:

- disclosed its business, key lifecycle management, certificate lifecycle management, and CA environmental control practices in its:
 - GTLSCA Certification Practice Statement [V1.0.6](#)
 - Certificate Policy for the Chunghwa Telecom ecommerce Public Key Certificate Policy [V2.1](#)
(Maintained and manage By Chunghwa Telecom)

- maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
 - GTLSCA's Certification Practice Statement is consistent with ePKI's Certificate Policy

- GTLSCA provides its services in accordance with Chungghwa Telecom ePKI provides its services in accordance with its Certificate Policy(ies) Únd GTLSCA's Certification Practice Statement

■ Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that :

- the integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles;
- the integrity of subscriber keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles;
- subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by GTLSCA);

■ Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that :

- logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorised individuals;
- the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorised and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities [V2.2.2](#), including the following:

CA Business Practices Disclosure

- Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
- Certificate Policy (Maintained and manage By Chunghwa Telecom)

CA Business Practices Management

- Certification Practice Statement Management
- CP and CPS Consistency
- Certificate Policy Management (Maintained and manage By Chunghwa Telecom)

CA Environmental Controls

- Security Management
- Asset Classification and Management
- Personnel Security
- Physical & Environmental Security
- Operations Management
- System Access Management
- System Development and Maintenance
- Business Continuity Management
- Monitoring and Compliance
- Audit Logging

CA Key Lifecycle Management Controls

- CA Key Generation

- CA Key Storage, Backup, and Recovery
- CA Public Key Distribution
- CA Key Usage
- CA Key Archival and Destruction
- CA Key Compromise
- CA Cryptographic Hardware Lifecycle Management

Certificate Lifecycle Management Controls

- Subscriber Registration
- Certificate Rekey
- Certificate Issuance
- Certificate Distribution
- Certificate Revocation
- Certificate Validation

GTLSCA does not escrow its CA keys, does not provide subscriber key generation services, and does not provide certificate suspension services. Accordingly, our assertion does not extend to controls that would address those criteria.

GTLSCA service management has assessed its disclosures of its certificate practices and controls over its CA service. during our assessment, we noted the following observations which caused the relevant criteria to not be met :

Observation	Relevant WebTrust Criteria
<p>During the audit period, no objective evidence was found regarding GTLSCA's audit and evaluation for third parties.</p>	<p>WebTrust Principles And Criteria for Certification Authorities - V2.2.2</p> <p>3.1.11</p> <p>Arrangements involving third party access to CA facilities and systems are based on a formal contract containing necessary security requirements.</p>

in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities [V2.2.2](#).



Ministry of Digital Affairs

Appendix A

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	<p>Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.100.0.9 [6]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.23459.100.0.0 [7]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.1 [8]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.2 [9]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.3 [10]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.4 [11]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.16.886.1.100.0.0 [12]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.1 [13]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.2 [14]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.3 [15]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.1 [15,1]Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: https://eca.hinet.net/repository</p>	
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		Certificate Related Information	Key Related Information
		Serial Number: 00996d5fe9ade16cdc8ecdbfedb14a 3295 Signature Algorithm: sha256RSA Not Before: 2019-07-19 14:46:45 a.m.(UTC+8:00) Not After: 2031-08-19 04:46:45 p.m.(UTC+8:00) Thumbprint Algorithm: sha1 Thumbprint: b2d151a768d30c3b99d86b8b25815 608c28ab2cb Thumbprint Algorithm: sha256 Thumbprint: 9d1cda1b9ef395afce7de0fe74de6d9 ff5e0d2a43789116c00c6ba5bf44b98 23	Subject Public Key: RSA(4096 bits) Authority Key Identifiers: 725bbaaa7238ee259024b59422f a0988ca8b0afb Subject Key Identifiers: d6eb2d9d61fe2bbb70882eb807b 159b0f483226a Basic Constraint: Subject Type=CA Path Length Constraint=0 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, Off-line CRL Signing, CRL Signing (86)
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