Valencia, July 27, 2026

INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE REPORT

To the management of INFRAESTRUCTURES I SERVEIS DE TELECOMUNICACIONS I CERTIFICACIO SA (hereinafter ACCV):

Scope

We have been engaged, in a reasonable assurance engagement, to report on ACCV management's assertion that for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at its locations as enumerated in Appendix C, throughout the period May 1, 2025 through April 30, 2026 for its CAs as enumerated in Appendix A, ACCV has:

- disclosed its TLS certificate lifecycle management business practices in its Certification Practice Statement, as enumerated in Appendix B, including its commitment to provide TLS certificates in conformity with the CA/Browser Forum Requirements on the ACCV website, and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices

- maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
  - the integrity of keys and TLS certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles; and
  - TLS subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by ACCV)

- maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
  - logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorized individuals;
  - the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
  - CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – TLS Baseline v2.9.

The CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates require the CA to operate controls to adhere to the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements. The WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Network Security address this requirement and are reported on in a separate report.

Certification authority's responsibilities

ACCV's management is responsible for its assertion, including the fairness of its presentation, and the provision of its described services in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – TLS Baseline v2.9.

Our independence and quality management

We have complied with the independence and other ethical requirements of the *Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants* issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, which is founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour.

The firm applies International Standard on Quality Management (ISQM) 1, *Quality Management for Firms that Perform Audits or Reviews of Financial Statements, or Other Assurance or Related Services Engagements* and accordingly maintains a comprehensive system of quality control including documented policies and procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

Practitioner's responsibilities

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our procedures. We conducted our procedures in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000, *Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information,* issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. This standard requires that we plan and perform our procedures to obtain reasonable assurance about whether, in all material respects, management's assertion is fairly stated, and, accordingly, included:

(1) obtaining an understanding of ACCV's TLS certificate lifecycle management business practices, including its relevant controls over the issuance, renewal, and revocation of TLS certificates;
(2) selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed TLS certificate lifecycle management practices;
(3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and
(4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.

ACCV's management has disclosed to us the attached comments (Appendix D) that have been posted publicly in the online forums of the Bugzilla site, as well as online forums of individual internet browsers that comprise CA/B Forum. We have considered the nature of these comments in determining the nature, timing and extent of our procedures.

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ACCV and their effect on assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying party locations.

Inherent limitations

There are inherent limitations in the effectiveness of any system of internal control, including the possibility of human error and the circumvention of controls. For example, because of their nature, controls may not prevent, or detect unauthorized access to systems and information, or failure to comply with internal and external policies or requirements. Also, the projection to the future of any conclusions based on our findings is subject to the risk that controls may become ineffective.

Opinion

In our opinion, throughout the period May 1, 2025 through April 30, 2026, ACCV management's assertion, as referred to above, is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – TLS Baseline v2.9.

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ACCV's services beyond those covered by the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – TLS Baseline v2.9, nor the suitability of any of ACCV's services for any customer's intended purpose.

Use of the WebTrust seal

ACCV's use of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities – TLS Baseline Seal constitutes a symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to update this report or provide any additional assurance.



F. Mondragon, Auditor

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Valencia, SPAIN

July 27, 2026

APPENDIX A: List of CAs in Scope

Root CAs
1. ACCVRAIZ1
7. ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024
9. ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024
OV SSL Issuing CAs
3. ACCVCA-120 [1] [2]
6. ACCV RSA1 TLS
8. ACCV ECC1 TLS
10. ACCV RSA1 TLS
EV SSL Issuing CAs
None
Private Trust Issuing CAs
None
Non-EV Code Signing Issuing CAs
None
EV Code Signing Issuing CAs
None
Secure Email (S/MIME) CAs
None
Document Signing CAs
2. ACCVCA-110 [1] [3]
4. ACCVCA-130 [1] [3]
Adobe CAs
None
Timestamp CAs (TSU issuer)
1. ACCVRAIZ1
TSU
5. TSA1 ACCV 2016
Other CAs
None

[1] SHA-1 Certificate revoked (11-06-2026)
[2] SHA-256 Certificate still valid
[3] SHA-256 Certificate revoked (12-06-2026)

CA Identifying Information for in Scope CAs

CA#	Cert #	Subject	Issuer	serialNumber	notBefore	NotAfter	SHA256 Fingerprint
1	1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	5EC3B7A6437FA4E0	May 5 09:37:37 2011 GMT	Dec 31 09:37:37 2030 GMT	9A6EC012E1A7DA9DBE34194D478AD7C0DB1822FB071DF12981496ED104384113
2	1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-110	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	20DC654677BFC815	Oct 13 11:22:04 2011 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	1345C2D39AE4B65CCA71E88E9A2B29C71DC913F952E935A812B004DBA7AE7957
2	2	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-110	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	337545D22DA86E4E	May 7 12:25:39 2015 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	E9327A347CBE1CB94CDC9AA54CB31B6E43D68968D17D09CE326A091BFC2F0B11
3	1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-120	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	6482C4AB654B00A6	Oct 13 14:55:04 2011 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	3BC51856040AD7FF6683AA85A0D34F9EA680CD23C37CB8A0423B0F89A24405B9
3	2	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-120	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	41F69CD2BD80C0B7	Jan 27 14:06:42 2015 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	2DE620F2D1200AA90B16C3CCF670FD7ED14379AB06FA8B031CFEF8DA051EA5A2
4	1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-130	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	51777CA6B938AF06	Oct 14 10:07:28 2011 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	8F7CC455E9A5507804120655D7139186253E43B00422E734263A0769D2F89F7D
4	2	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-130	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	5394E41746519E96	Jan 15 10:23:24 2015 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	572BF899FD774362DC19219625ECC157BB55434EA5166D5758DC4B4F890D6653
5	1	C=ES, ST=Valencia, L=Valencia, O=Agencia de Tecnología y Certificación Electrónica - ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=TSA1 ACCV 2016	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	0D74AF664BB5690D	Feb 29 16:37:50 2016 GMT	Feb 25 16:37:50 2029 GMT	2C8D4233F9BC80934E466F0C9F76411F65A5C1789830160B666859EF93DE2566
6	1	C=ES, ST=VALENCIA, L=BURJASSOT, O=ISTEC, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, CN=ACCV RSA1 TLS	CN=ACCVRAIZ1, OU=PKIACCV, O=ACCV, C=ES	59F9FC1B2331FFE40B5DFE39A89BC298	Jul 1 10:32:47 2025 GMT	Nov 30 23:59:00 2030 GMT	11F9571C30C2DE232753D5B158C54F77B0A02DFF417135752D32E98B89BC9719
7	1	CN=ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	CN=ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	709AC5A1FE22492333C90CC5E2D76471EEAD462C	Feb 27 11:26:00 2024 GMT	Jan 26 11:25:59 2049 GMT	79CD55455296ADFB55CDF0DBE9176985A0B503C544276C5A9305F2EC9B66693A
8	1	CN=ACCV ECC1 TLS, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	CN=ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	4C7E6E23F36F962B7378651B8A607FE052C3A7AA	Feb 27 14:20:09 2024 GMT	Feb 23 14:20:08 2039 GMT	93C087AB9331B74C0FCCCE11BC61FB9FA6D432077D8F1018194FA4CCA664D781

CA#	Cert #	Subject	Issuer	serialNumber	notBefore	NotAfter	SHA256 Fingerprint
9	1	CN=ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	CN=ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	381FDB936B069B920AF147A214762683478AD738	Feb 27 11:19:26 2024 GMT	Jan 26 11:19:25 2049 GMT	B40BFA8880A02F93025643C6DBBD39DF194A2854D076E167A2BD8467CF9E2C34
10	1	CN=ACCV RSA1 TLS, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	CN=ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	167A018DA5247A15433761A6AD5D8294A6424EE0	Feb 27 14:18:56 2024 GMT	Feb 23 14:18:55 2039 GMT	346440CF7674A529305545563322FCFB38F5A4B3F1E7E852DFF8A4B7A5EF72D1

APPENDIX B: LIST OF CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENTS

- **ACCV's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) and Policies (CP) for website authentication certificates**

Version	Begin Effective Date	End Effective Date	Changes
4.0.20 4.0.20 (MD)	13 March 2026	02 June 2026	Change in certificate validity. DNSSEC verification included. MPIC review and changes.
4.0.19 4.0.19 (MD)	25 November 2025	12 March 2026	Include reference to Mass Revocation Incident Preparation and Testing Plan. EKU change
4.0.18 4.0.18 (MD)	10 July 2025	24 November 2025	New internal cross SubCA
4.0.17 4.0.17 (MD)	03 June 2025	09 July 2025	Consolidation of CPS and CP
4.0.16*	12 February 2025	02 June 2025	New TLS hierarchy and review

***NOTE:** Website CPs and Website CPS were consolidated into CPS version 4.0.17 (03/06/2025). Website authentication CPS version 4.0.16 shall be read in conjunction with the following CPs for website authentication certificates:

- **CP for Qualified certificates for Electronic Office on a secure device** – v6.0.3 (12/02/2025)
- **CP for Qualified certificates for Electronic Office on software support** – v6.0.3 (12/02/2025)
- **CP for Qualified certificates for Websites Authentication** – v5.0.3 (12/02/2025)
- **CP for No Qualified certificates for Websites Authentication** – v2.0.3 (12/02/2025)

APPENDIX C: LOCATIONS

Location Name	Location Type	Location	In-Scope for Physical and Environmental Control Testing
Corporate Headquarters	Main office	Burjassot (Valencia), Spain	Yes
Online CA hosting	Main Datacenter	Paterna (Valencia), Spain	Yes
Alternative Online CA hosting	Secondary Datacenter	Paterna (Valencia), Spain	Yes

APPENDIX D: DISCLOSURE OF INCIDENTS DURING THE PERIOD

	Matter Topic	Matter Description
N/A, since no incidents occurred during the audit period.		

Other Matter:
During the reporting period, a number of publicly disclosed Bugzilla entries were identified and assessed as part of the engagement. Based on our evaluation, these entries do not constitute WebTrust incidents for the reporting period. They are presented below for informational purposes only.

- 2031663 - ACCV: Transition Plan for Existing Root
- 1988341 - Add ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024 and ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024 root certificates

ACCV MANAGEMENT'S ASSERTION

The INFRAESTRUCTURES I SERVEIS DE TELECOMUNICACIONS I CERTIFICACIO SA operates the Certification Authority (CA) services known as "ACCVRAIZ1", "ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024" and "ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024" (hierarchies with its subordinated Certification Authorities as detailed in Appendix A) and provides TLS CA services.

The management of **ACCV** is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its TLS CA operations, its TLS CA business practices disclosure on its website (https://www.accv.es/quienes-somos/practicas-y-politicas/certification-practice-statement/ and https://www.accv.es/quienes-somos/practicas-y-politicas/certification-policy/), TLS key lifecycle management controls, and TLS certificate lifecycle management controls. These controls contain monitoring mechanisms, and actions are taken to correct deficiencies identified.

There are inherent limitations in any controls, including the possibility of human error, and the circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective controls can only provide reasonable assurance with respect to **ACCV's** Certification Authority operations. Furthermore, because of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.

ACCV management has assessed its disclosures of its certificate practices and controls over its CA services. Based on that assessment, in providing its TLS Certification Authority (CA) services at the locations enumerated in Appendix C, throughout the period May 1st 2025 through April 30th 2026, **ACCV** has:

- disclosed its TLS certificate lifecycle practices in its Certification Practice Statement (as enumerated in Appendix B), including its commitment to provide TLS certificates in conformity with the CA/Browser Forum Requirements on the **ACCV** website, and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
- maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
  - the integrity of keys and TLS certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles; and
  - TLS subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by **ACCV**)
- maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
  - logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorized individuals;
  - the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
  - CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – TLS Baseline v2.9.



Juan Alegre Sanahuja
Managing Director

July 27, 2026

Appendix A: PKI Hierarchy in scope of the WebTrust audit

Root CAs
1. ACCVRAIZ1 7. ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024 9. ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024
OV SSL Issuing CAs
3. ACCVCA-120 6. ACCV RSA1 TLS 8. ACCV ECC1 TLS 10. ACCV RSA1 TLS
EV SSL Issuing CAs
None
Private Trust Issuing CAs
None
Non-EV Code Signing Issuing CAs
None
EV Code Signing Issuing CAs
None
Secure Email (S/MIME) CAs
None
Document Signing CAs
2. ACCVCA-110 4. ACCVCA-130
Adobe CAs
None
Timestamp CAs (TSU issuer)
1. ACCVRAIZ1
TSU
5. TSA1 ACCV 2016
Other CAs
None

CA#	Cert #	Subject	Issuer	serialNumber	notBefore	NotAfter	SHA256 Fingerprint
1	1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	5EC3B7A6437FA4E0	May 5 09:37:37 2011 GMT	Dec 31 09:37:37 2030 GMT	9A6EC012E1A7DA9DBE34194D478AD7C0DB1822FB071DF12981496ED104384113
2	1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-110	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	20DC654677BFC815	Oct 13 11:22:04 2011 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	1345C2D39AE4B65CCA71E88E9A2B29C71DC913F952E935A812B004DBA7AE7957
2	2	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-110	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	337545D22DA86E4E	May 7 12:25:39 2015 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	E9327A347CBE1CB94CDC9AA54CB31B6E43D68968D17D09CE326A091BFC2F0B11
3	1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-120	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	6482C4AB654B00A6	Oct 13 14:55:04 2011 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	3BC51856040AD7FF6683AA85A0D34F9EA680CD23C37CB8A0423B0F89A24405B9
3	2	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-120	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	41F69CD2BD80C0B7	Jan 27 14:06:42 2015 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	2DE620F2D1200AA90B16C3CCF670FD7ED14379AB06FA8B031CFEF8DA051EA5A2
4	1	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-130	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	51777CA6B938AF06	Oct 14 10:07:28 2011 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	8F7CC455E9A5507804120655D7139186253E43B00422E734263A0769D2F89F7D
4	2	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVCA-130	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	5394E41746519E96	Jan 15 10:23:24 2015 GMT	Dec 31 23:59:00 2026 GMT	572BF899FD774362DC19219625ECC157BB55434EA5166D5758DC4B4F890D6653
5	1	C=ES, ST=Valencia, L=Valencia, O=Agencia de Tecnología y Certificación Electrónica - ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=TSA1 ACCV 2016	C=ES, O=ACCV, OU=PKIACCV, CN=ACCVRAIZ1	0D74AF664BB5690D	Feb 29 16:37:50 2016 GMT	Feb 25 16:37:50 2029 GMT	2C8D4233F9BC80934E466F0C9F76411F65A5C1789830160B666859EF93DE2566
6	1	C=ES, ST=VALENCIA, L=BURJASSOT, O=ISTEC, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, CN=ACCV RSA1 TLS	CN=ACCVRAIZ1, OU=PKIACCV, O=ACCV, C=ES	59F9FC1B2331FFE40B5DFE39A89BC298	Jul 1 10:32:47 2025 GMT	Nov 30 23:59:00 2030 GMT	11F9571C30C2DE232753D5B158C54F77B0A02DFF417135752D32E98B89BC9719
7	1	CN=ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	CN=ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	709AC5A1FE22492333C90CC5E2D76471EEAD462C	Feb 27 11:26:00 2024 GMT	Jan 26 11:25:59 2049 GMT	79CD55455296ADFB55CDF0DBE9176985A0B503C544276C5A9305F2EC9B66693A
8	1	CN=ACCV ECC1 TLS, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	CN=ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	4C7E6E23F36F962B7378651B8A607FE052C3A7AA	Feb 27 14:20:09 2024 GMT	Feb 23 14:20:08 2039 GMT	93C087AB9331B74C0FCCCE11BC61FB9FA6D432077D8F1018194FA4CCA664D781

CA#	Cert #	Subject	Issuer	serialNumber	notBefore	NotAfter	SHA256 Fingerprint
9	1	CN=ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	CN=ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	381FDB936B069B920AF147A214762683478AD738	Feb 27 11:19:26 2024 GMT	Jan 26 11:19:25 2049 GMT	B40BFA8880A02F93025643C6DBBD39DF194A2854D076E167A2BD8467CF9E2C34
10	1	CN=ACCV RSA1 TLS, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	CN=ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024, organizationIdentifier=VATES-A40573396, O=ISTEC, L=BURJASSOT, ST=VALENCIA, C=ES	167A018DA5247A15433761A6AD5D8294A6424EE0	Feb 27 14:18:56 2024 GMT	Feb 23 14:18:55 2039 GMT	346440CF7674A529305545563322FCFB38F5A4B3F1E7E852DFF8A4B7A5EF72D1

Appendix B: CP/CPS documents in scope of the WebTrust audit

- **ACCV's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) and Policies (CP) for website authentication certificates**

Version	Begin Effective Date	End Effective Date	Changes
4.0.20 4.0.20 (MD)	13 March 2026	02 June 2026	Change in certificate validity. DNSSEC verification included. MPIC review and changes.
4.0.19 4.0.19 (MD)	25 November 2025	12 March 2026	Include reference to Mass Revocation Incident Preparation and Testing Plan. EKU change
4.0.18 4.0.18 (MD)	10 July 2025	24 November 2025	New internal cross SubCA
4.0.17 4.0.17 (MD)	03 June 2025	09 July 2025	Consolidation of CPS and CP
4.0.16*	12 February 2025	02 June 2025	New TLS hierarchy and review

***NOTE:** Website CPs and Website CPS were consolidated into CPS version 4.0.17 (03/06/2025). Website authentication CPS version 4.0.16 shall be read in conjunction with the following CPs for website authentication certificates:

- **CP for Qualified certificates for Electronic Office on a secure device** – v6.0.3 (12/02/2025)
- **CP for Qualified certificates for Electronic Office on software support** – v6.0.3 (12/02/2025)
- **CP for Qualified certificates for Websites Authentication** – v5.0.3 (12/02/2025)
- **CP for No Qualified certificates for Websites Authentication** – v2.0.3 (12/02/2025)

Appendix C: Locations

Location Name	Location Type	Location	In-Scope for Physical and Environmental Control Testing
Corporate Headquarters	Main office	Burjassot (Valencia), Spain	Yes
Online CA hosting	Main Datacenter	Paterna (Valencia), Spain	Yes
Alternative Online CA hosting	Secondary Datacenter	Paterna (Valencia), Spain	Yes

Appendix D: Disclosure of incidents during the period

	Matter Topic	Matter Description
N/A, since no incidents occurred during the audit period.		

Other Matter:
During the reporting period, no Bugzilla entries were recorded qualifying as WebTrust incidents. However, the following entries are presented for informational purposes only:

- 2031663 - ACCV: Transition Plan for Existing Root
- 1988341 - Add ACCV ROOT RSA TLS 2024 and ACCV ROOT ECC TLS 2024 root certificates