

INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE REPORT

To the Management of Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR):

Scope

We have been engaged, in a reasonable assurance engagement, to report on KIR Management's statement that for its Certification Authority (CA) operations in Warsaw, Poland, and supporting facilities in Warsaw District, Poland, throughout the period of time from December 19, 2020 to December 18, 2021, for its CAs as enumerated in Appendix A, KIR has:

- ▶ disclosed its business, key lifecycle management, certificate lifecycle management, and CA environmental control practices in its:
 - [Certification Practice Statement version 1.15](#) and
 - [Certificate Policy version 1.10](#)
- ▶ maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
 - KIR's Certification Practice Statement is consistent with its Certificate Policy; and
 - KIR provides its services in accordance with its Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement
- ▶ maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
 - the integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles;
 - the integrity of subscriber keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles;
 - subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by KIR); and
 - subordinate CA certificate requests are accurate, authenticated, and approved
- ▶ maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
 - logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorized individuals;
 - the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
 - CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in accordance with the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities v2.2.1](#),

KIR does not provide Subordinate CA [cross-]certification, Subscriber Key Management Services, CA-Provided Subscriber Key Storage and Recovery Services. Accordingly, our report does not extend to controls that would address those criteria.

KIR management has disclosed to us the attached matters (Appendix B) that have been posted publicly in the online forums of the Bugzilla site, as well as the online forums of individual internet browsers that comprise the CA/Browser Forum. We have considered the nature of these comments in determining the nature, timing, and extent of our procedures.

Certification Authority's responsibilities

KIR's Management is responsible for its statement, including the fairness of its presentation, and the provision of its described services in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities Version 2.2.1.

Our independence and quality control

We have complied with the independence and other ethical requirements of the *Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants* issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, which is founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour.

The firm applies International Standard on Quality Control 1, and accordingly maintains a comprehensive system of quality control including documented policies and procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

Auditor's responsibilities

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on Management's statement based on our procedures. We conducted our procedures in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 Revised, *Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information*, issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. This standard requires that we plan and perform our procedures to obtain reasonable assurance about whether, in all material respects, Management's statement is fairly stated, and, accordingly, included:

- 1) obtaining an understanding of KIR's key and certificate lifecycle management business practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and confidentiality of subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate lifecycle management operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity;
- 2) selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate lifecycle management business practices;
- 3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and
- 4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.

Relative effectiveness of controls

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at KIR and their effect on assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying party locations.

Inherent limitations

Because of the nature and inherent limitations of controls, KIR's ability to meet the aforementioned criteria may be affected. For example, controls may not prevent, or detect and correct, error, fraud, unauthorized access to systems and information, or failure to comply with internal and external policies

or requirements. Also, the projection of any conclusions based on our findings to future periods is subject to the risk that changes may alter the validity of such conclusions.

Opinion

In our opinion, throughout the period of time from December 19, 2020 to December 18, 2021, KIR Management's statement, as referred to above, is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities Version 2.2.1.

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of KIR's services beyond those covered by the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities Version 2.2.1, nor the suitability of any of KIR's services for any customer's intended purpose.

Use of the WebTrust seal

KIR's use of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Seal constitutes a symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to update this report or provide any additional assurance.

Jakub Walarus
EY, Warsaw, Poland



Jakub Jerzy
Walarus

Digitally signed by Jakub Jerzy
Walarus
DN: cn=Jakub Jerzy Walarus,
c=PL
Date: 2022.03.04 16:55:29
+01'00'

March 4, 2022

Appendix A: List of CAs in Scope

CA	CERT	SUBJECT	ISSUER	SERIAL NUMBER	KEY ALGORITHM	KEY SIZE	SIGNATURE ALGORITHM	NOT BEFORE	NOT AFTER	SUBJECT KEY IDENTIFIER	SHA-256 FINGERPRINT	OTHER INFORMATION
1	1	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	00 e6 09 fe 7a ea 00 68 8c e0 24 b4 ed 20 1b 1f ef 52 b4 44 d1	rsaEncryption	2048 bits	sha1RSA	2011-12-06	2031-12-06	53 92 A3 7D FF 82 76 F0 33 D4 EB 92 67 47 61 33 1B 68 3B 2A	FABCF5197CDD7F458AC33832D3284021DB2425FD6BEA7A2E69B7486E8F51F9CC	
1	2	CN = SZAFIR Trusted CA O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	49 ea 1d 0b 8c 6b 31 d5 28 72 92 15 98 4e 3c 25 0a 0e 9e 7b	rsaEncryption	2048 bits	sha1RSA	2011-12-15	2021-12-15	B5 AC 95 16 D0 EA 3D 5D 5C D9 FA 9D 59 51 7B 5E 91 91 AF 81	E3761C3BF89D507851E3565AE92DA15B012E0B6B3E1734B01BC63B9FE3E8670C	
2	1	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA2 O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA2 O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	3e 8a 5d 07 ec 55 d2 32 d5 b7 e3 b6 5f 01 eb 2d dc e4 d6 e4	rsaEncryption	2048 bits	sha256RSA	2015-10-19	2035-10-19	2E 16 A9 4A 18 B5 CB CC F5 6F 50 F3 23 5F F8 5D E7 AC F0 C8	A1339D33281A0B56E557D3D32B1CE7F9367EB094BD5FA72A7E5004C8DED7CAFE	
2	2	CN = SZAFIR Trusted CA2 O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA2 O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	77 59 4f bb 22 70 38 fb 52 09 7e 61 a2 b7 f8 85 05 4c 4f 7b	rsaEncryption	2048 bits	sha256RSA	2015-10-26	2025-10-26	1E 75 BC 33 A3 1F 6A CC 7E CF DD 05 3E DB BB DA 7C BC E9 44	E22E6B25908E1107A607AF060E0B24E50C6D9562FF04F455BE0F8DF41A5032C0	

Appendix B: List of Bugzilla issues noted during the period under review

	Observation	Relevant WebTrust Criteria	Publicly Disclosed Link
1	Existing certificates with OCSP response Unknown were noted. Technical change to OCSP system was planned and then implemented.	Criterion number 6.8, Certificate Validation The CA maintains controls to provide reasonable assurance that timely, complete and accurate certificate status information (including Certificate Revocation Lists and other certificate status mechanisms) is made available to relevant entities (Subscribers and Relying Parties or their agents) in accordance with the CA's disclosed business practices.	Bugzilla link
2	Certificates with validity period equal to 1 year and 1 second were detected. Schedule for revocation of affected certificates was proposed. Certificates were revoked and reissued, while progression was regularly reported. Also a plan for installation of ACME server was planned and executed in order to prevent such issues in future.	Criterion number 6.4, Certificate Issuance The CA maintains controls to provide reasonable assurance that certificates are generated and issued in accordance with the CA's disclosed business practices.	Bugzilla link
3	Issue concerned delay in revocation of certificates related to bug 1708965. Explanation for the delay was written by KIR, as delay concerned certificates used for banking system in Poland. Schedule for revocation of delayed certificates was proposed. Certificates were revoked and reissued, while progression was regularly reported. Also a plan for installation of ACME server was planned and executed in order to prevent such issues in future.	Criterion number 6.6, Certificate Revocation The CA maintains controls to provide reasonable assurance that certificates are revoked, based on authorised and validated certificate revocation requests within the time frame in accordance with the CA's disclosed business practices.	Bugzilla link

KRAJOWA IZBA ROZLICZENIOWA S.A.'S MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR) operates the Certification Authority (CA) services as enumerated in Attachment A, and provides the following CA services:

- Subscriber registration
- Certificate renewal
- Certificate rekey
- Certificate issuance
- Certificate distribution
- Certificate revocation
- Certificate suspension
- Certificate validation
- Certificate status information processing
- Subscriber key generation
- Integrated circuit card life cycle management

The management of KIR is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its CA operations, including its CA business practices disclosure on its website <https://www.elektronicznypodpis.pl/>, CA business practices management, CA environmental controls, CA key lifecycle management controls, subscriber key lifecycle management controls and certificate lifecycle management controls and subordinate CA certificate lifecycle management controls. These controls contain monitoring mechanisms, and actions are taken to correct deficiencies identified.

There are inherent limitations in any controls, including the possibility of human error, and the circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective controls can only provide reasonable assurance with respect to KIR's Certification Authority operations. Furthermore, because of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.

KIR management has assessed its disclosures of its certificate practices and controls over its CA services. Based on that assessment, in KIR management's opinion, in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services in Warsaw, Poland, and supporting facilities in Warsaw District, Poland, throughout the period December 19, 2020 to December 18, 2021, KIR has:

- disclosed its business, key lifecycle management, certificate lifecycle management, and CA environmental control practices in its:
 - [Certification Practice Statement of KIR v.1.15](#) and
 - [Certificate Policy of KIR v.1.10](#);
- maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
 - KIR's Certification Practice Statement is consistent with its Certificate Policy;
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 - the integrity of subscriber keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles;
 - subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by KIR);
 - subordinate CA certificate requests are accurate, authenticated, and approved;

- maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
 - logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorised individuals;
 - the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
 - CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorised and performed to maintain CA systems integrity;

in accordance with the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities v2.2.1](#), including the following:

CA Business Practices Disclosure

- Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
- Certificate Policy (CP)

CA Business Practices Management

- Certificate Policy Management
- Certification Practice Statement Management
- CP and CPS Consistency

CA Environmental Controls

- Security Management
- Asset Classification and Management
- Personnel Security
- Physical & Environmental Security
- Operations Management
- System Access Management
- System Development and Maintenance
- Business Continuity Management
- Monitoring and Compliance
- Audit Logging

CA Key Lifecycle Management Controls

- CA Key Generation
- CA Key Storage, Backup, and Recovery
- CA Public Key Distribution
- CA Key Usage
- CA Key Archival and Destruction
- CA Key Compromise
- CA Cryptographic Hardware Lifecycle Management
- CA Key Escrow

Subscriber Key Lifecycle Management Controls

- CA-Provided Subscriber Key Generation Services
- Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Lifecycle Management
- Provides Subscribers with requirements for Key Management

Certificate Lifecycle Management Controls

- Subscriber Registration
- Certificate Renewal
- Certificate Rekey
- Certificate Issuance
- Certificate Distribution
- Certificate Revocation
- Certificate Suspension
- Certificate Validation

KIR does not provide Subordinate CA [cross-]certification, Subscriber Key Management Services, CA-Provided Subscriber Key Storage and Recovery Services. Accordingly, our statement does not extend to controls that would address those criteria.

Management of Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A.

Signed by /
Podpisano przez:
 Robert Trętowski
Date / Data:
2022-03-04
13:56
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Signed by /
Podpisano przez:
Wojciech Janusz
Pantkowski
Date / Data:
2022-03-04 14:26

March 4, 2022



KIR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY

Attachment A: List of CAs in Scope

CA	CERT	SUBJECT	ISSUER	SERIAL NUMBER	KEY ALGORITHM	KEY SIZE	SIGNATURE ALGORITHM	NOT BEFORE	NOT AFTER	SUBJECT KEY IDENTIFIER	SHA-256 FINGERPRINT	OTHER INFORMATION
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2	1	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA2 O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA2 O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	3e 8a 5d 07 ec 55 d2 32 d5 b7 e3 b6 5f 01 eb 2d dc e4 d6 e4	rsaEncryption	2048 bits	sha256RSA	2015-10-19	2035-10-19	2E 16 A9 4A 18 B5 CB CC F5 6F 50 F3 23 5F F8 5D E7 AC F0 C8	A1339D33281A0B56E557D3D32B1CE7F9367EB094BD5FA72A7E5004C8DED7CAFE	
2	2	CN = SZAFIR Trusted CA2 O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	CN = SZAFIR ROOT CA2 O = Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. C = PL	77 59 4f bb 22 70 38 fb 52 09 7e 61 a2 b7 f8 85 05 4c 4f 7b	rsaEncryption	2048 bits	sha256RSA	2015-10-26	2025-10-26	1E 75 BC 33 A3 1F 6A CC 7E CF DD 05 3E DB BB DA 7C BC E9 44	E22E6B25908E1107A607AF060E0B24E50C6D9562FF04F455BE0F8DF41A5032C0	

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